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While both sociologists and organizational theorists have incorporated qualitative data
into theory building, contemporary social psychologists have resisted this trend. This
resistance may be the product of long-standing perceptions of the discipline of social
psychology that equate it with controlled experimentation. Yet, this was not always the
case. Many respected social psychologists, including Muzafer Sherif, Edgar Schein, and
Leon Festinger, relied on qualitative data from real-world contexts to ground theory
building. Following their example, we discuss the possibilities of reviving social psycho-
logical approaches to theory building that integrate qualitative field data with quantitative
data collected in laboratory experiments. We first justify why qualitative data are important
to social psychological theory building by examining some of the strengths and weak-
nesses that have been demonstrated in other research domains. We then use several
‘‘classic’’ social psychological studies to illustrate specific tactics for integrating qualita-
tive data with traditional experimental data in social psychological research. These
examples demonstrate the flexibility and synergies of combining qualitative and quantita-
tive data. They also suggest that social psychological theory building may benefit from a
‘‘return to our roots’’ and an embrace of qualitative data. r 2000 Academic Press
INTRODUCTION
‘‘Psychological’’ social psychologists have embraced experimentation and
experimental data with a passion that often appears to brook no compromise. The
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discipline as a whole has become identified with this single methodology. No fair
observer can deny that the development and growth of the field has depended on
creative manipulation of experimental situations coupled with statistical tech-
niques of comparison and contrast (i.e., the general linear model). Experimenta-
tion is predicated on the control of situations by the experimenter, comparison of
groups that are exposed to different stimuli, and measurement of responses in
statistically comparable ways. Psychological literatures on attitudes, social cogni-
tion, and person perception could not have flourished without this ability to vary
the stimuli to which individuals and groups are exposed and without the ability to
compare responses systematically.
Data that work well to answer such types of questions may not, however, be
equally effective for all areas of inquiry. Most social psychological research
domains assume that the interpretation of research contexts by participants is
relatively unproblematic and that these contexts are fixed, varying only along the
dimensions that experimenters have manipulated. Yet, some research arenas, such
as small-group research, raise issues that depend on more unpredictable and
dynamic behavior within an interaction domain (i.e., an arena of action in which
group cultures are formulated and specified through the creation of shared
meanings; Fine, 1981). In contrast to the conditions of the experimental model,
interaction domains are conceived of as collective realities whose meanings
develop from the contexts in which they are embedded. They cannot exist without
shared understandings and collective meanings, and they cannot be evaluated
without data that reflect their dynamic and interactive nature. Indeed, it is ironic
that the experimental social psychologist is often the only one in such situations
who refuses to be attuned to the creation of shared realities (Hardin & Higgins,
1995).
Yet, cracks have appeared in the traditional experimental model of social
psychology that suggest a recognition of and emphasis on the importance of
meaning and context in experimental situations. For example, some scholars have
challenged the perceived wisdom of controlled experimentation in contemporary
social psychology. In his influential article ‘‘Social Psychology as History,’’
Kenneth Gergen (1973) emphasizes that experimental results are socially and
historically grounded. How could it be otherwise? Yet, in making this claim, he
profoundly challenges standing orthodoxy and undercuts the comforting claim
that social psychologists are examining universal or generic principles of social
life. His argument is that meaning is tied to local conditions as well as to universal
processes, a view that fits into the epistemology of qualitative research. It is
through understanding particulars that more general principles of interaction can
emerge. Culture mediates the effects of social psychological forces.
Gergen’s stance is consistent with theory-building traditions of earlier research-
ers in social psychology—traditions that include introspection, observation, and
in-depth interviews. Such qualitative traditions, even if not currently well repre-
sented in the pages of social psychology journals and peripheral to graduate and
undergraduate training, are reminders of roads not taken. These roads may be
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particularly significant in an age in which other once-highly quantitative social
sciences (e.g., organizational behavior and sociology) have embraced and incor-
porated qualitative data and in which interaction with colleagues in the humani-
ties have become the norm, not the exception. These trends suggest that social
psychologists may benefit from examining the meanings of experimental situa-
tions, in addition to examining the acts and attitudes of individuals who occupy
those domains. In this vein, our goal is to explore why and how qualitative data
can be integrated with traditional, quantitative experimental data in social
psychological theory building.
In the following sections, we first define the primary forms of qualitative data
used by social scientists. We then discuss the theory-building strengths and
weaknesses of these data forms. Next, we describe six specific tactics that social
psychologists might use to integrate qualitative field data with quantitative
laboratory data in theory building and illustrate the use of each tactic in a
‘‘classic’’ social psychology study. Finally, we discuss the value of qualitative
data for the future of social psychological research.
Forms of Qualitative Field Data
The two most prevalent forms of qualitative data are observations and in-depth
interviews. The former is often referred to as ‘‘ethnographic data,’’ but as
ethnography typically involves both observation and interviews (Denzin &
Lincoln, 1994; Lofland & Lofland, 1995; McCall & Simmons, 1969; Spradley,
1979, 1980; Taylor & Bogdan, 1997), we differentiate the two methodologies in
this analysis and use the term ethnography to refer to those methodological
strategies that involve both observations and interviews.
Observational data. Qualitative data obtained from observations are favored by
many sociological social psychologists, particularly those aligned with the
symbolic interactionist perspective (Blumer, 1969). To obtain these data, the
researcher observes a group, community, or social scene, compiling field notes
(Lofland & Lofland, 1995). The observer may take one of several stances toward
the group (Adler & Adler, 1987; Gold, 1958)—peripheral membership (being an
interested outsider), active membership (participating in the group as a re-
searcher), and complete membership. In the latter case, the researcher may
explain his or her research interests to the members of the group or may collect
data without explanation, establishing a covert role (Fine, 1980). The goal is to
capture the richness and meaningful character of the behavior and talk in a setting,
i.e., to understand what it means to be a participant in the social situation.
A risk in relying on observational data lies in the possibility of observer bias.
What one ‘‘observes’’ is filtered through one’s experience (bias in interpretative
stance), and one’s presence in a situation inevitably affects—to a greater or lesser
extent—how participants respond (observer bias). Paradoxically, this risk may
also be the observer’s greatest strength, allowing him or her to interpret the
cultural meaning of events, thereby providing data that are enriched in ways that
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quantitative data, including that collected through observational techniques,
cannot be. As Adler and Adler (1994, p. 40) suggest,
Quantitative observations, conducted in situations deliberately designed to ensure standard-
ization and control, differ markedly from observations framed by the qualitative paradigm.
Qualitative observation is fundamentally naturalistic in essence; it occurs in the natural
context of occurrence, among the actors who would naturally be participating in the
interaction, and follows the natural stream of everyday life. As such, it enjoys the advantage
of drawing the observer into the phenomenological complexity of the world, where
connections, correlations, and causes can be witnessed as and how they unfold. Qualitative
observers are not bound, thus, by predetermined categories of measurement or response, but
are free to search for concepts or categories that appear meaningful to subjects.
In-depth interview data. A second source of information about what people do
and think is stories. In-depth interviewing presumes that one can understand how
the world is known by asking informants to answer open-ended questions about
their experiences.1 Interviews differ in the degree to which informants set the
agenda, but in all instances informants describe their own experiences at length,
including personal narratives or life histories. In-depth interviews are frequently
used to collect differing perspectives on a topic. If a researcher wishes to
understand the experience of rape, for example, she or he can interview victims of
rape (Davis, Brickman, & Baker 1991), those who run rape crisis centers
(Matthews, 1994), court officials (Martin & Powell, 1994), the relatives of victims
or perpetrators (Smith & Trepper, 1992), or the rapists themselves (Scully &
Marolla, 1985).
The risk in relying on such data is that it constitutes talk (i.e., rhetoric)
generated for a particular purpose in a specific context. This talk may differ
significantly from what the informant ‘‘felt,’’ how the situation was seen by an
observer, or how an informant might report this event on other occasions. Further,
some topics may be more appropriate for interviews than others. Issues involving
strong norms of social desirability or taboo topics may produce misleading
interview responses and often are better examined through observation.
Strengths of Qualitative Data for Theory Building: Accuracy
Although contemporary experimental social psychologists have sparingly used
qualitative data in their theory building, social scientists in the related areas of
sociology and organizational theory have widely employed these data in recent
years (Morrill & Fine, 1997). Examining sociologists’ and organizational theo-
rists’ use of qualitative data, as well as that of earlier social psychologists,
suggests that social psychology may benefit from reacquaintance with qualitative
1 Ethnographers refer to those observed as ‘‘informants’’ rather than the psychologists’ label of
‘‘participants.’’ The former seems to impart more dignity and agency to the observed.
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inquiry as a means of improving the practical relevance of their theories.2 As
Denzin and Lincoln (1994, p. 4) summarize,
The word qualitative implies an emphasis on processes and meanings that are not rigorously
examined, or measured (if measured at all), in terms of quantity, amount, intensity, or
frequency. Qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality, the
intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and the situational
constraints that shape inquiry. Such researchers emphasize the value-laden nature of inquiry.
They seek answers to questions that stress how social experience is created and given
meaning.
A qualitative perspective leads to theories that have important strengths relative to
those based on traditional experimental methods. In particular, qualitative data
produce theories that more accurately describe real-world issues and processes
than do quantitative data. We suggest that this is accomplished by allowing for
theories that are relevant, rich, and dynamic in their explanations of social
processes.
Relevance and richness in theory building. Qualitative research is based on the
assumption that informants are excellent judges of which issues are worth
examining. By permitting one’s informants to set the agenda, underlining their
perspectives, we generate theory based upon data that are linked to the immediate
experiences of participants rather than to the removed experiences of researchers,
who are constrained by their methodological choices. Instead of being limited to a
set of narrow topics, often highly cognitive and individualistic, social psycholo-
gists who use qualitative data in their theory building can explain naturalistic
behavior. As Glaser and Strauss (1967, p. 238) assert,
A grounded theory that is faithful to the everyday realities of a substantive area is one that
has been carefully induced from diverse data. . . . Only in this way will the theory be closely
related to the daily realities (what is actually going on) of substantive areas, and so be highly
applicable to dealing with them.
In addition, qualitative data allow researchers to study social domains that may
not be easily accessible to laboratory researchers. For example, while social
psychologists may fret about having experimental participants provide pretend-
shocks to confederates, such actions are insignificant compared to the brutal
attacks sometimes found outside laboratory walls. Not only do experimental
participants not yell, they do not seduce, slap, kiss, gossip, or cry. Other behavior
that can be produced in the laboratory (e.g., lying, betrayal, anxiety) is found
much more dramatically in situations connected to self-interests and long-term
2 Given that few social psychologists have conducted research using qualitative data we begin by
describing the two dominant ethnographic methodologies of observation and in-depth interviewing
(see Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). We emphasize the consensually accepted styles of these methodolo-
gies, recognizing that each methodology is driven by disputes and debates. Our discussion excludes
content analysis, archival analysis, participatory research, and other methodological strains not
because these approaches are unimportant, but to achieve focus.
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relationships. Qualitative research provides the opportunity to examine social
processes in social domains such as gang initiations, police interrogations, and
plant closings (Sutton & Schurman, 1985; Sutton, 1991).
Finally, qualitative data provide a context for understanding social processes
that cannot be duplicated in the laboratory. As a result, qualitative data are often
described as ‘‘rich.’’ Their complexity gives a picture of informants’ meaning of
the social world and behavioral processes that might not otherwise be available.
Those interested in developing concepts see the richness of data as essential
(Sutton & Staw, 1995). These scholars propose that quantitative data themselves
do not constitute theory, but that theories require the additional richness provided
by qualitative insight. Mintzberg (1979, p. 113) argues,
Theory building seems to require rich description, the richness that comes from anecdote.
We uncover all kinds of relationships in our ‘‘hard’’ data, but it is only through the use of this
‘‘soft’’ data that we are able to ‘‘explain’’ them, and explanation is, of course, the purpose of
research. I believe that the researcher who never goes near the water, who collects
quantitative data from a distance without anecdote to support them, will always have
difficulty explaining interesting relationships. . . .
Capturing the dynamics of behavior in theory building. Another widely cited
benefit of qualitative data, notably from field observations, is that one can capture
the dynamics and evolution of social processes over time (Eisenhardt, 1989). Just
as narration depicts sequences of behavior, so does field observation. The
standard social psychological experiment is a brief ‘‘one-shot’’ affair, examining
fleeting, relatively inconsequential interactions among strangers. After an hour or
less, the participant has been processed and the information gathered. This has led
social psychological theory to be profoundly atemporal, ignoring dimensions of
long-term social change. Data from participant observation, with its demand that
researchers share experiences with informants, allow researchers to witness
alterations in the attitudes and behavior of those they observe. Such data have
been employed by organizational theorists in developing process models of
human behavior (e.g., decision processes (Eisenhardt, 1989), identification pro-
cesses (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996), and brainstorming processes (Sutton &
Hargadon, 1996)).
In a related manner, qualitative data allow researchers to capture the position of
narratives in social life. While social psychologists have been interested in scripts
and schemas (e.g., Abelson, 1981), their interest in narrative derives from a
different concern. At issue is the dynamic ‘‘story-making’’ capacity of social
actors. Narrative thinking and subsequent presentation of these narratives to
audiences in social situations constitute a significant component of behavior. We
live in a world of meaningful stories (Bruner, 1986). Relating stories is a primary
means by which external effects are made real and consequential for individuals
and groups. Baumeister and Newman (1994, p. 676) argue,
First, people interpret experiences relative to purposes, which may be either objective goals
or subjective fulfillment states. Second, people seek value and justification by constructing
stories that depict their actions and intentions as right and good. Third, people seek a sense
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of efficacy by making stories that contain information about how to exert control. Fourth,
people seek a sense of self-worth by making stories that portray themselves as attractive and
competent.
It is through rebuilding the world in dynamic, sequential (and, implicitly, causal)
fashion and then presenting that world to others that meaning is generated. Such
sequential organization is best understood by examining it naturalistically, with-
out reference to artificially constructed categories. Through qualitative data, the
process as a whole is preserved. We lose something critical by ignoring the
totality in examining the parts.
Weaknesses of Qualitative Data for Theory Building: Complexity and Specificity
While the above discussion suggests that qualitative data may allow social
psychologists to produce theories that are more valid (i.e., more relevant, rich, and
dynamic) than those grounded in experimental data alone, qualitative data also
limits theory building. Researchers who rely on qualitative data as a sole basis for
their theories may produce frameworks that are highly complex and limited in
breadth. While Janesick (1994, p. 217) argues that, ‘‘the value of the [qualitative]
case study is its uniqueness,’’ that uniqueness may be the product of a theory that
is too specific and difficult to generalize.
First, theory solely based on qualitative data can be daunting in its complexity.
Especially in a single-case study, it may be difficult for audiences to recognize
when, where, and how such a theory can be applied and how the process described
might unfold in other contexts. Second, even if relatively simple theories are
developed from qualitative data, such theories are often specific to a setting and
challenging to apply elsewhere (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). While multiple case
studies are a remedy for the problem of scope (Eisenhardt, 1989; Noblit & Hare,
1988; Stake, 1994), the resulting theories may become complex as they become
generalizable. As a result, one must integrate findings across cases rather than
simply attending to the variables that explain the most variance (as might be done
if quantitative data were used) (Mintzberg, 1979). The richness of qualitative data
that leads to theories that are descriptive of the real world also produces theories
that are notable for their complexity. Strauss and Corbin (1994, p. 279) note,
Grounded theories are very ‘‘fluid’’. . . . Because they embrace the interaction of multiple
actors, and because they emphasize temporality and process, they indeed have a striking
fluidity. They call for exploration of each new situation to see if they fit, how they might fit,
and how they might not fit. They demand an openness of the researcher, based on the
‘‘forever’’ provisional character of every theory.
INTEGRATING QUALITATIVE FIELD DATA WITH QUANTITATIVE
LABORATORY DATA: THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS?
Theory-building with qualitative data involves trade-offs. In particular, qualita-
tive data provide some important trade-offs between the accuracy (i.e., confor-
mity to truth), simplicity (i.e., ease of understanding or application), and general-
izability (i.e., extension to new domains) of resulting theories (Weick, 1979).
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According to Thorngate’s (1976) postulate of commensurate complexity, it is
impossible for a theory in the behavioral sciences to be simultaneously general,
accurate, and simple. The more simple and accurate a theory is, for example, the
less generalizable it is likely to be in a variety of contexts. Weick (1979, p. 35)
explains,
To grasp the implications of this postulate, imagine the face of a clock. At twelve o’clock is
inscribed the word general, at four o’clock is inscribed the word accurate, and at eight
o’clock is inscribed the word simple. The mnemonic device to store away these observations
is simply the word GAS. If we array this postulate across the face, we can see the dilemma
inherent in any research. If you try to secure any two of the virtues of generality, accuracy,
and simplicity, you automatically sacrifice the third one.
Experimental laboratory research might be categorized as 6 o’clock research, i.e.,
simple and accurate, but questionable in its generalizability. As Cialdini (1980, p.
23) notes, the most commonly used experimental data in social psychological
research ‘‘allow us to capture phenomena without regard for their importance in
the course of naturally occurring human behavior.’’ By contrast, many quantita-
tive field studies involving large data sets that use proxies to measure real-life
phenomena (e.g., surveys to measure consumer confidence) might be categorized
as 10 o’clock research, i.e., simple and generalizable but lacking in accuracy.
Finally, as noted above, multiple qualitative case studies, involving in-depth
interviews and observation of actors across several research sites [what Glaser
and Strauss (1967) define as ‘‘grounded theory’’], may provide theory that falls at
2 o’clock, accurate and potentially generalizable but excessively complex (single
qualitative case studies fall at 4 o’clock—accurate but complex and specific).
Following Thorngate, it appears that any single method of data collection (e.g.,
FIG. 1. Methodological trade-offs in theory building.
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laboratory experiments, qualitative case studies, quantitative field studies) results
in trade-offs in the resulting theory’s simplicity, generalizability, and accuracy.
Weick (1979) suggests that the solution is not to search for a method that
combines all three elements (accuracy, simplicity, and generalizability) but to
build theory by alternating among sets of data that provide one or more of these
elements or by incorporating the research of others who have data that comple-
ment one’s own. As he puts it,
If, for example, my style of scholarship falls at ten o’clock, then I should try especially hard
to locate people at the four o’clock position, and I should be certain that I understand their
work and maintain some contact with that work. Better still might be the solution in which I
alternate my research style and systematically try to move among the various positions over
the duration of a year or a career. (Weick, 1979, p. 41)
Cialdini (1980, p. 44) suggests that social psychologists should approach theory
building by starting with hypothesis building through multiple, real-world obser-
vations (i.e., general and accurate data), proceeding to specific laboratory tests of
those hypotheses (i.e., simple and accurate data), and, finally, cycling back to
further real-world observations for refinement. He proposes that a ‘‘full-cycle’’
approach to theory building may ‘‘reduce the extent to which current social
psychological research can be criticized as artificial and epiphenomenal.’’
Building on these suggestions, we propose that qualitative data may best serve
social psychologists as part of a multimethod research design that integrates
qualitative and quantitative data. Ethnographic data complement experimental
data. By presenting compelling data, qualitative researchers can generate what
Herbert Blumer (1969) speaks of as ‘‘sensitizing concepts.’’ These concepts,
closer to lived experience, recursively provide insight that permits the generation
of hypotheses that can be tested through experimental data. While the ability to
generate constructs central to the development of testable hypotheses is not the
only justification for qualitative data, it is one means by which qualitative and
quantitative data can be integrated, incorporating data for purposes of triangula-
tion (Fielding & Fielding, 1986).
To illustrate, we outline two approaches for integrating ethnographic data with
experimental data. First, we discuss three recipes for theory building that
sequentially combine qualitative field data and experimental laboratory data.
These combined data approaches extend the full-cycle approach suggested by
Cialdini and Weick. Second, we discuss three situations in which qualitative data
may be merged with experimental data in the same research project. In these
situations, one may be able to gather different kinds of data that simultaneously
produce simple, accurate, and generalizable theory. These tactics for integrating
ethnographic and experimental data are summarized in Table 1.
Sequencing Ethnographic Data and Experimental Data in Theory-Building
A vast body of existing literature describes how to design empirical research for
theory testing, and a substantial (although smaller) literature describes how to
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TABLE 1
Tactics for Combining Qualitative Field Data and Quantitative Lab Data in Social Psychological
Theory Building
Tactic
Illustrative example from
classic social psychology Strengths/weaknesses
Sequential tactics
1. Fully involved participant
observation followed by
experimental test by same
authors
Cialdini & Schroeder
(1976)
Strength
Real world defines variables
Weakness
Lab is poor proxy for real world
2. In-depth interviews followed
by experimental test by sepa-
rate author(s)
Schein (1956), Freedman
& Fraser (1966)
Strength
Provides data about process
Weakness
Separate authors not as close to
data
3. Experimental test followed
by systematic nonparticipant
observation by same
author(s)
Zimbardo (1969) Strength
Provides process analysis of
variables defined by lab
Weakness
Lab results may bias observation
Merged tactics
1. Combine quantitative and
qualitative data from par-
ticipants in contrived
experimental settings
Milgram (1963) Strength
Provides direct information
about participant emotions &
cognitions
Weakness
May not generalize to nonlab
settings
2. Combine quantitative and
qualitative data from partici-
pants in loosely defined, field
experiments
Sherif et al. (1953,
1961)
Strength
Allows analysis of group pro-
cess
Weakness
Experimental setting constrains
and limits behavior of partici-
pants
3. Combine quantitative and
qualitative data from ‘‘natu-
rally’’ occurring field experi-
ments
Festinger et al. (1956) Strength
Naturally occurring data allows
observation ‘‘in context’’
Weakness
Experimenter cannot control
many variables, and important
effects may not ‘‘happen’’ by
chance
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build empirically grounded theory. In social psychological research, this literature
has emphasized qualitative field studies for theory building (Glaser & Strauss,
1967) and laboratory experiments for theory testing (Campbell & Stanley, 1963).
Advancing conceptual understanding requires more than selecting either induc-
tion or deduction. As noted, Weick (1979) and Cialdini (1980) suggest that cycles
of induction and deduction help develop theory that is reliable, valid, and clear.
Cycling between induction and deduction is important to social psychological
theory building in at least two ways. First, cycling encourages both expansion and
refinement of theory. Much as a still-life artist alternates between ‘‘painting out’’
(expanding the boundaries of an object) and ‘‘painting in’’ (reestablishing the
edge of an object), inductive/deductive cycles in theory building allow us to refine
or redefine the core of a working framework (e.g., the idea that public commit-
ments may affect one’s self-perceptions and future actions) while extending its
perimeter (e.g., examining how public commitments that are symbolic vs substan-
tive affect self-perceptions). Further, inductive/deductive cycles help determine
which peripheral ideas strengthen the core and which constitute new branches of
inquiry.
Second, cycling emphasizes the dynamic character of social systems. Organiza-
tional theorists, for example, increasingly take the perspective that social groups
are dynamic, open systems, constantly in flux and affecting and affected by the
external environment (Scott, 1981). As a consequence, using static ‘‘snapshots’’
of such a group increases the chance that scholars will ‘‘tinker with the wrong
things, destroy natural controls that are in place, and basically meddle the
organization into a mess . . . insensitivity to process promotes the destruction of
deviation—counteracting causal relationships’’ (Weick, 1979, p. 43). Using
cycles of induction and deduction to examine systems in flux is more likely to
capture the changing nature of social groups than research that uses only one of
these tactics.
Despite the apparent benefits of cyclical theory building in the social sciences,
few published studies have made explicit how phases of induction and deduction
have been linked and even fewer present prescriptions for those who wish to link
these phases. One exception is Cialdini’s (1980) insightful essay on full-cycle
social psychology, rarely cited in social science journals. In the following section,
we develop a set of tactics, or ‘‘recipes,’’ for combining phases of inductive
qualitative ethnography and deductive quantitative experiments. In doing so, we
provide guidance and encouragement for ‘‘full cycle’’ research.
To provide the most well-rounded theory when cycling between inductive and
deductive data, we propose that one should choose inductive data that provide
general and accurate theory and deductive data that provide simple and accurate
theory. Based on this logic, cycling between qualitative, inductive data (e.g.,
information about individuals’ displayed behavior, sense-making, and emotions
revealed in in-depth interviews or real-life activities) and quantitative, deductive,
experimental data (e.g., quantifiable differences between individuals’ stated
preferences or opinions in response to a variety of fabricated situations or
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role-playing exercises) will lead to theory that is simple, accurate, and generaliz-
able.
Qualitative observation and in-depth interviews have gained popularity as
reality checks on quantitative proxies for real-life phenomena (Locke & Golden-
Biddle, 1996). Becker (1993) notes that qualitative research is distinct from such
forms of quantitative inquiry because, among other things, qualitative strategies
analyze phenomena from the individual’s perspective and secure richer descrip-
tions of the social world than do quantitative researchers relying on ‘‘remote,
inferential empirical materials’’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 5).
In contrast, traditional laboratory research is a reliable method of testing
hypotheses and settling disputes among competing theories. As Campbell and
Stanley (1963, p. 3) note in their classic handbook on experimental design,
‘‘experimentation [is] the basic language of proof, as the only decision court for
disagreement between rival theories.’’ Because of their usefulness in controlling
for extraneous influences and actively manipulating independent variables in
social settings, experimental data are widely used for testing social psychological
hypotheses (Brown & Melamed, 1990).
In the following sections, we discuss three tactics for sequentially combining
ethnographic data with experimental data. Specifically we examine (1) personal
involvement in a naturally occurring event followed by an experimental test, (2)
in-depth interviewing of participants in a naturally occurring event followed by an
experimental test, and (3) an experimental test followed by observation of natural
contexts to validate findings. We illustrate each tactic with a ‘‘classic’’ social
psychological study.
Qualitative hypothesis-building based on personal involvement followed by
experimental test of hypothesis. Frequently, social psychologists are inspired by
personal observations of social processes in everyday life to generate testable
hypotheses. Lyn Lofland reports,
For the past twenty years the ‘‘vantage point’’ when I’m doing direct observation has
continued to be constant. Since I’m ‘‘passing’’ as someone who is simply hanging about in
public, I get engaged by others in interaction, though I have rarely initiated it myself. . . . A
lot of my data have come from situations in which I was out in public for non-research
purposes. That is, I watch myself acting in public and note what I do and what others do
vis-a-vis me, just as if I were someone else. So, I guess you could say that I move from being
the largely uninvolved observer to the fully involved participant observer. . . . Obviously, I
don’t take myself as a stand-in for ‘‘everywoman,’’ but neither do I think my reactions are
likely to be that peculiar. (Adler & Adler, 1994, p. 379)
While the initial field ‘‘insight’’ that characterize such studies should be
differentiated from the more formal expectations of qualitative methodologies, as
Lofland notes above, this insight often leads to more rigorous, ‘‘fully involved’’
participant observation. It would not be far from the mark to claim that much
experimental research has its origin in the life-world of the researcher. In one
sense, people live their lives as ‘‘participant observers’’; how could they not? The
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self-reflective social psychologist builds on these experiences, considering them
as representative of the experiences of others.
The effectiveness of this tactic is illustrated by a series of papers by Robert
Cialdini and his colleagues (see Cialdini, 1980, for a review). Like Lofland,
Cialdini and his coauthors analyzed their own experiences of social influence and
power in their inductive theory building. In one study, Cialdini was struck by the
efficacy of requests for paltry contributions in acquiring large donations. His
experience in giving a large donation to a United Way solicitor only after hearing
the plea ‘‘even a penny will help’’ was the qualitative ‘‘event’’ that led to his
theory that small requests legitimated larger requests. Based on this event, he and
his colleagues developed a theory describing the self-presentation pressures put
on target individuals by paltry requests.
The qualitative analysis that led to this theory was notable in two ways. First, it
relied on observation and interaction in public spaces as well as on participation in
social life. This information allowed the researchers to note what actually
happened in contrast to what reasonable people might expect to happen. From a
single event, they systematically noted similar events. Although a deeper apprecia-
tion of social influence could have been learned through more intensive partici-
pant observation as a solicitor or through in-depth interviews, this case demon-
strates the potential of using thoughtfully observed events to generate testable
hypotheses. Second, the theory relied relatively little on previous examinations of
social behavior. Instead, the authors built their framework upon common experi-
ences rather than on laboratory findings. This inductive process increased the
likelihood that the theory was an accurate description of the social experience
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
After they generated hypotheses, the authors explored their qualitatively
induced claims through controlled experiments. Cialdini and Schroeder (1976)
carried out a set of field experiments to test their observations about the
effectiveness of paltry requests and to test the validity of two competing
explanations (i.e., people gave money because they were image conscious or
because they perceived a greater need when they believed that ‘‘only a penny will
help’’). Although these experiments were not exact replications of natural
settings, they helped the researchers isolate the effects of different independent
variables (e.g., the need to legitimate one’s image vs the desire to behave
rationally) that could not be examined in their qualitative inquiry. Results
supported the legitimation hypothesis and not the social need hypothesis. In this
way, Cialdini and Schroeder’s hypothesis testing not only confirmed parts of the
proposed theory, but also disconfirmed alternate explanations and simplified the
theory that was ultimately presented.
Qualitative hypothesis-building based on in-depth interviews followed by
experimental test of the hypotheses. This sequence is found in several classic
social psychological studies. Yet, rather than treated by the same author in a single
paper, this sequence of qualitative theory building and experimental theory testing
has typically been carried out in a sequence of studies by different authors. The
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qualitative theory building phase often is based on in-depth interviewing that
focuses on a recent or ongoing social psychological ‘‘event’’ (e.g., a political
decision, a leadership succession, an organizational scandal, or a human trauma).
For example, Schein’s (1956) study of the brainwashing of American prisoners of
war relied on intensive interviewing and informal discussions, or ‘‘bull sessions,’’
with soldiers immediately following their POW experience. The interviews were
actually performed on the USNS ‘‘General Black’’ during the soldiers’ transit
back to the United States. Schein (1956, p. 149) asserts,
. . . intensive interviewing was felt to be preferable [to other objective psychological tests]
for gathering data . . . because the material to be obtained was highly novel, and because the
men had been through a highly traumatic situation which might make the eliciting of any
information very difficult. It was also recognized that the men might find it difficult to
remember, might be reluctant to relate certain experiences, and might retrospectively falsify
many events.
In-depth interviews led to a highly detailed process model (vs a variance
model) describing a social psychological phenomenon (Mohr, 1982). Schien’s
study suggested that a process that involved a pacing of demands from small to
great was important in changing prisoners’ self-perceptions and stated beliefs.
This process orientation is made possible by collecting data in ‘‘real time’’ or by
having interviewees recreate the sequence of events after the fact. In the case of
Schein’s (1956) brainwashing study, a composite verification of process by many
informants insured that the reported sequences were valid. This focus on social
psychological process is a clear benefit of in-depth interviewing or observation.
In the second part of this sequence, the theory that arises from in-depth
interviewing is tested by separate authors in later papers. Schein’s research was
directly tested in a set of experiments on the ‘‘foot-in-the-door technique’’ (i.e., if
a person complies with a small request, he or she is likely to also comply with a
subsequent larger request). Freedman and Fraser (1966) noted that Schein’s study
of Korean brainwashing tactics supported the notion of a ‘‘foot-in-the-door’’
concept but did not provide a rigorous test. Their work, by contrast, attempted to
test the notion directly and in several different contexts. As they put it,
One assumption about compliance that has often been made either explicitly or implicitly is
that once a person has been induced to comply with a small request he is more likely to
comply with a larger demand. This is the principle that is commonly referred to as the
foot-in-the-door or gradation technique and is reflected in the saying that if you ‘‘give them
an inch, they’ll take a mile.’’ It was, for example, supposed to be one of the basic techniques
upon which the Korean brainwashing tactics were based. . . . The present research attempted
to provide a rigorous, more direct test of this notion as it applies to compliance and to
provide data relevant to several alternative ways of explaining the effect. (Freedman &
Fraser, 1966, p. 196)
Although these authors lacked the first-hand contact with the data that grounded
the theories, they isolated specific independent variables that were reported to
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have significant impacts on the observed processes and examined their effects on
a dependent variable. Freedman and Fraser (1966) found that the foot-in-the-door
technique worked even if the second, larger request was made by someone other
than the one who made the initial request and even if the second request was about
a different issue. Although they did not test the entire theory of social process
developed through qualitative analysis, they manipulated and tested the effects of
a few crucial variables. In these sequences, a further cycling back to the field (that
may include observations as well as interviews) can reexamine the process,
focusing on the variables shown to be important as a result of experimental tests.
As Cialdini (1980, p. 43) concludes,
Natural observation should not be restricted to the beginnings of the research venture; it
should be used as well to complete the final arc in the circle. That is, naturally occurring
instances should be employed not only to identify effects suitable for experimental study but
also to check on the validity of the findings from that experimentation.
Experimental test of hypotheses followed by systematic observation to validate
hypotheses. This sequence is hard to find in a single paper and, in fact, constitutes
the second and third parts of Cialdini’s full-cycle social psychology. In cases
where this sequence is found in a single paper, it usually follows some early
theory building based on naturally occurring events. The full-cycle (i.e., qualita-
tive event, experimental test, qualitative field study) is often completed by this
strategy.
Zimbardo’s (1969) experiments on deindividuation provide a compelling
illustration of this sequence. He begins with a set of observations about violence,
riots, and collective behavior from mass media reports. Based on these events, he
develops a qualitative, working framework describing the processes of deindividu-
ation in groups. He then tests parts of this framework in a set of experiments on
anonymity and aggression with both college students and Belgian soldiers
(Zimbardo, 1969). The outcomes of these experiments verified some of his
general hypotheses about anonymity and aggression (e.g., they demonstrated how
being unidentifiable in a situation in which aggressive acts appear normative may
cause individuals to feel deindividuated and uninhibited in joining in aggressive
acts). Yet, the controlled nature of the experimental data also left several questions
unanswered and, in some cases, prompted him to consider other variables that
could affect the process of deindividuation. Zimbardo (1969, p. 279) reflected,
The situation and tasks were all very structured, intellectual, and cognitive. To obtain a
precise dependent measure, we recorded [aggressive behavior] in a series of fixed duration
trials. However, fixed, discrete trials impose constraints on the ‘‘release’’ of any behavior
and make spontaneous, impulsive behavior impossible. . . . Because we wanted to study
individual behavior in a social context rather than group behavior, no group interaction was
allowed. Thus, we cut off all potential for ‘‘behavioral contagion’’ (the major concept
linking individual processes of deindividuation to mass action, as occurs in riots and orgies)
(cf. Wheeler, 1966). The omnipresence of a rational, responsible member of the establish-
ment (the experimenter) also probably had an inhibiting effect upon impulsive aggression.
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In response to these shortcomings, Zimbardo sought naturally occurring
occasions ‘‘to demonstrate that the aggression observed under our contrived
laboratory conditions of anonymity or unidentifiability is really a genuine
phenomena of the human condition’’ (Zimbardo, 1969, p. 282). He engaged in a
textual analysis of recent media reports examining aggressive acts in the real
world. Zimbardo concluded that vandalism was the ‘‘prototype’’ of aggressive
behavior committed under conditions of anonymity (Zimbardo, 1969, p. 282). He
drew on his own experience in observing the vandalism of parked cars in New
York City. Based on this experience and qualitative data, he began to refine his
theory of anonymity and aggression to include a set of six distinct stages by
examining vandalism, including its spontaneous and impulsive qualities. His
return to qualitative inquiry helped verify his earlier experimental findings and
refine his theory of deindividuation.
Because his initial laboratory findings may have biased his field observations,
Zimbardo conducted a field experiment (observing reactions of passersby to an
abandoned automobile) to test his six-stage theory of vandalism and to ‘‘observe
in a more systematic fashion who are the vandals and what are the conditions
associated with their acts of vandalism’’ (Zimbardo, 1969, p. 287). His exemplary
cycling between qualitative theory building and experimental theory testing
continued into a second full round.
The above tactics for sequentially combining qualitative theory building and
experimental theory testing in social psychological research demonstrate how
scholars may reintegrate such data into their inquiry. While it is surely true that
social psychologists do not employ qualitative research as extensively as sociolo-
gists, these attempts indicate the potential use of such methodologies within a
context of theory development. If more casual than what might be accepted in
other research traditions, the fundamental premise that insight results from close
observation of the natural world is present.
Merging Qualitative Field Data and Quantitative Experimental Data
in Theory Building
Although quantitative and qualitative research often have been posed as
antithetical, experimenters do, in fact, create or choose settings that can be
examined qualitatively as well as quantitatively. In such research in experimental
settings, one can simultaneously gather quantitative measures (such as responses
on attitude scales, sociometric ratings, or observations of measurable behavior)
while bolstering understanding of the quantitative variables with an analysis of
the rich, detailed data that characterize qualitative research (such as extracts from
interviews or narrative accounts of naturally occurring behavior). A situation can
contain both qualitative and quantitative data, and both can be used to generate
theory in the same project.
We argue that combining or merging qualitative and quantitative data collected
from the same situation may lead to theory building that is enriched in its attention
to accuracy, simplicity, and generalizability. In the following sections, we de-
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scribe three tactics for theory building that merge qualitative and quantitative data
from experimental situations. These tactics involve merging qualitative and
quantitative data from (1) laboratory experiments, (2) field observations with
independent variables arranged and manipulated by the experimenter, and (3)
field observations with naturally occurring independent variables.3 The tactics
differ according to the power of the experimenter/observer to set the conditions of
the situation.
Theory-building through ‘‘repeated ethnographies’’ in a laboratory experi-
ment. Controlled, fabricated experiments are marked by a critical difference that
separates them from many other situations: the existence of a fabricator (Goff-
man, 1974, p. 73). The experimental social psychologist must—as a sine qua non
of the experimental method—create a meaningful situation, as a playwright
might, with the scenery set, the actors employed, and the lines scripted, and, like
the playwright, gets to see the scenes so created played over and over again.4 The
experimenter sets the terms of the encounter (Couch, 1984) and, because of the
ability to replicate the encounter, is able to determine the effects of the setting on
individual behavior. The strength of this methodology is that the constructed
scene is repeated at will, creating both qualitative and quantitative knowledge.
Constructed experimental settings that often involve deceiving participants, a
fleeting time period, and the use of artificial tasks have been treated as fundamen-
tally distinct from ‘‘natural interaction.’’5 Perhaps because these settings have
been seen as so distinct from the ‘‘real world,’’ the qualitative data produced by
them have not been central in social psychological theory building. The worlds
that experimental social psychologists create have been treated as so contrived
3 In some degree social psychologists use these ‘‘merged methods’’ but typically casually and
occasionally. Qualitative research is rarely incorporated in a systematic way in experimental research.
Perhaps most common is the occasional use of ‘‘verbal protocols,’’ but these techniques typically are
used to support statistical points rather than to generate theory.
4 Like any ‘‘play,’’ social psychological experiments require tryouts or previews (labeled ‘‘pilot
testing’’) to insure that the script is plausible. In some cases experiments do not produce the desired
results, and, as a result, researchers must tinker with the scene. Although researchers often do not
report these ‘‘failures,’’ such reporting would permit readers to learn what revision in the participants’
understanding of the situation generated the significant results.
5 Experiments are often, although not always, set within the confines of university laboratories or
classrooms. These places are physically real and, more than that, have norms and expectations
associated with them. The ‘‘laboratory’’ has meaning for participants. Individuals entering a psycho-
logical laboratory attempt to make sense of it, just as they do anywhere else (Goffman, 1974). The
behavior found in laboratories can be analyzed in light of situational meanings, as can all behavior ‘‘in
the real world.’’ Participants may have past experiences that they can draw upon, have read or heard
dramatic accounts of laboratory life, or have been explained something about their rights and
responsibilities. Group experiments have their own shared reality, including a recalled past, an
immediate present, and a prospective future (Maines, Sugrue, & Katovich, 1983), producing a group
culture or ‘‘idioculture’’ (Fine, 1987, p. 125). Further, because of the importance of the authority of the
researcher, the experiment is not so different from occasions in which clients enter spaces controlled
by those who process and control them (medical offices, police stations), and because laboratory
experiments typically involve strangers in brief and constrained interactions, they can be likened to
urban encounters and commercial transactions.
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that the specifics of the behavior have little bearing on more routine social
activity. This need not be the case. We argue that laboratory experiments do
generate behavior that can be interpreted qualitatively. This behavior, like all
behavior, results from inferred meanings, expectations, norms, and values. The
rules of social interaction, described in detail by sociologists, are not repealed just
because a participant enters a ‘‘laboratory.’’ While experimental social psycholo-
gists have typically used these descriptions only to add dramatic color to the
statistical discussion, such a choice is not inevitable. Descriptions and analyses of
social interaction in a laboratory can be effectively merged with numerical
dependent variables to understand the situational meanings of participants and
can aid in the development of theory. Specifically, social psychologists can use the
virtue of the experiment in producing a set of identical situations to treat each
instance as an ethnographic opportunity, thus employing the tactic of ‘‘repeated
ethnographies.’’
While numerous studies might be used as examples, we select Stanley Mil-
gram’s (1974) Obedience Study: a methodologically sophisticated set of experi-
ments in which Milgram continually altered the structural conditions of the
setting to examine their effects (e.g., proximity of experimenters or victims on the
behavior of participants). We are fortunate that, because of the fame (or infamy)
of this study of the ‘‘effects of punishment on learning,’’ Milgram was inspired to
write a full-length book. Perhaps as a consequence of its audience, the volume is
filled with dramatic qualitative ‘‘field’’ data, taken from transcripts of laboratory
interaction. For participants, the situation was ‘‘gripping’’ (Milgram, 1974, p. 4,
see p. 33). In the experiment, a participant was required to give ‘‘dangerous’’
shocks to a confederate whenever the confederate gave an incorrect answer in a
learning experiment, even after the confederate complained about a heart condi-
tion, screamed in pain, and no longer responded. The key dependent measure was
whether the ‘‘teacher’’ continued to give shocks or at what shock level he or she
rebelled. If this was not a natural event, the accounts reveal that participants
believed that it was ‘‘real.’’ The power of Milgram’s conclusions depended on the
fact that participants responded.
Milgram (1974, p. xii) insists that his theory building stems from the similarity
of his laboratory to other realms: ‘‘The laboratory problem is vivid, intense, and
real. It is not something apart from life, but carries to an extreme and very logical
conclusion certain trends inherent in the ordinary functioning of the social
world.’’ As a result, examining the details of the behavior of participants is
analytically significant. As Milgram (1974, pp. 44–45) asserts, justifying the
inclusion of observations and extensive dialogues, ‘‘the quality of each person’s
experience gives us clues to the nature of the process of deliberation.’’ Milgram
recognizes that the qualitative data are not merely dramatic evidence of statistical
findings, but that the data help readers understand the process of obedience. If
these participants are ‘‘naive’’ about the experimental design, they are sophisti-
cated in wrestling with an ethically challenging setting in which they must
simultaneously obey and separate themselves; the standard dependent variables
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do not permit an examination of their deliberation. Milgram (1974, pp. 10, 47)
notes that participants utilized accounts, appeals, and role distance to manage
their self-presentations, alternately blaming the victim and the experimenter and
striving to preserve an unblemished self-image, claiming, for instance, that the
participant ‘‘was so stupid and stubborn he deserved to be shocked’’ or that ‘‘I was
paid for doing this. I had to follow orders.’’ The study is not only about whether
and under what circumstances people obey authority (the statistical dependent
measures); it is also about how one presents oneself as a moral social actor. From
reading the transcripts that Milgram provides, it is evident that parties to the
experiment adjusted their behavior to the claims of others, their rights and
responsibilities, and their brief shared history, attempting to balance the demands
of the experimenter and the participant, as when one comments plaintively, ‘‘I
don’t understand why the experiment is placed above this person’s life’’ (Mil-
gram, 1974, p. 48). These are individuals struggling to make sense of a particular
situation—a situation that seems to have gone terribly awry.
As a tactic of theory building, Milgram organized a meaningful situation that he
was able to replicate at will. In effect, Milgram’s ‘‘experiment’’ consists of
repeated ‘‘ethnographies.’’ Although qualitative research has been criticized
because the situations appear unique and idiosyncratic, analyzing experimental
situations qualitatively permits comparative analysis of this behavior. With so
many similar ‘‘situations,’’ it becomes possible to understand the public perfor-
mance of emotions (Shott, 1979), the display of accounts for malfeasance, and
strategies of collusion and deception. These are processes that occur in numerous
situations and, because of their broad applicability, constitute what sociologists
term ‘‘generic processes’’ (Couch, 1987; Couch & Weiland, 1986).
We do not claim that Milgram defined himself as a ethnographer or even that he
treated his transcripts as ‘‘part’’ of his experiment; still, in making his powerful
argument, Milgram frequently relied on the detailed behavior of participants to
build theory, providing plausible explanations for his ‘‘shocking’’ findings. Just as
participants’ quantitative responses are ordered and consistent, so too is other
behavior. Even though these are fabricated situations, artificial in how they were
established, the responses of participants make them meaningful, analyzable in
their own terms. Milgram (1974, p. 13) notes that simplicity is key to scientific
inquiry. His dependent measures strip situations to their cores; however, he
recognizes that in order to make his case it is necessary to present qualitative
accounts of the actions and responses of participants. Milgram (1974, p. xii)
attempts to construct ‘‘a situation that constructs the essence of obedience’’—a
situation that must be known in its general dimensions and its specific behavior.
These data give insight in the process of ‘‘real’’ obedience, demonstrating that the
participants acted out of a desire to uphold a legitimate moral order and not from
personal aggression.
Theory-building through triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data in a
field experiment. A second tactic to combine qualitative and quantitative data
involves using a naturalistic field experiment to generate theory. While experiment-
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ers fabricate situations in natural situations (in the ‘‘field’’), once the independent
variables have been set, the researcher typically does not provide detailed scripts;
rather he or she permits events to play out, observing individual and group
behavior. In such situations, researchers can triangulate the data (Fielding &
Fielding, 1986), using the findings from qualitative and quantitative measures to
help specify the other.
Although a distinguished tradition of field experimentation exists in social
psychology, many studies downplay the actions and remarks of participants,
merely using the natural setting as a location in which dependent measures can be
gathered and ignoring the meanings of participants. In contrast, we describe the
profound examination of intergroup competition and cooperation conducted by
Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues, a study known as the Robbers’ Cave Experi-
ment (Sherif et al., 1961; see also Sherif et al., 1953). Sherif and his colleagues
(1961, p. ix) wished to transcend what they saw as an artificial boundary between
unwieldy naturalistic observations of everyday groups and experimental rigor that
lacked validity. In this study, the experimenters created summer camps for rival
groups of preadolescent boys, providing an arena for experiment and ethnogra-
phy. Using the technique qualitative researchers term ‘‘triangulation,’’ they
searched for parallels in data produced by multiple methodologies (Fielding &
Fielding, 1986). While the structure of the camp was set by the researchers (e.g.,
the times when the two groups of campers would meet and the problems that they
would encounter), the researchers were enjoined to engage in extensive partici-
pant observation (almost 500 h in total), influencing group behavior as little as
possible and focusing on behavior that recurred (Sherif et al., 1961, pp. x, 57, 73).
The researchers were focused on the structure of group competition and
cooperation. As a result, they carefully observed how the boys created group
structure; how they responded to an external, competitive group; how the groups
learned to work together after encountering a set of crises; and, eventually, how
the boys formed an integrated group. By setting tasks for their preadolescent
charges, Sherif and his colleagues examined how intergroup hostility—over
resources and status—developed and how such hostility could be tran-
scended—by establishing superordinate goals. The researchers created a set of
hypotheses and in most instances collected both quantitative and qualitative data
as part of the test of these hypotheses. The quantitative measures demonstrated the
robustness of the findings, while the qualitative data, as in the Milgram experi-
ment, provided explanations for the process. For instance, quantitative data
demonstrated that in-group/out-group membership had a strong effect on estima-
tions of success, while the qualitative data demonstrated that the effects operated
through boundary maintenance, in-group sociometric structure, and establishment
of collective meanings (Sherif et al., 1961, pp. 69–95).
The Robbers’ Cave Experiment transcends the usual divisions between experi-
mental and ethnographic research in that the collection and presentation of
qualitative data equals the statistical measures in importance. Sherif and his
colleagues (1961, p. 204) emphasize the importance of a ‘‘combination of
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methods,’’ using ‘‘participant observers’’ to take field notes, while emphasizing
that the ‘‘activities and the interaction in [the setting] were experimental.’’ While
they used no control groups as such, the conditions of interaction for the groups
(isolation, pressure to compete, and the need to cooperate) serve, in effect, as
independent variables. The responses of the boys (stereotype ratings, friendship
choices, judgments of performances) are quantitative-dependent measures. At the
same time, the outcome measures of the experiment also included details of the
cultural life of the boys, such as nicknames the boys established to identify their
groups and insults used to denigrate the others. The power of the analysis derives
from the fact that one can simultaneously see the boys’ reactions to the camp
structure through objective measures and through cultural responses. The tactic of
triangulating one’s findings using quantitative and qualitative data provides
confidence in the reliability of the conclusions and confidence in their validity.
In this experimental field setting, the behavior of participants is less constrained
than in Milgram’s laboratory. Sherif’s preadolescents made the experimental
setting their own by establishing expectations, norms, feeling rules, a status
system, and a robust group culture. Participants became a ‘‘natural’’ group. Even
though they did not create the setting and were somewhat constrained in their
behavior, the meanings they created were central to understanding conflict and
cooperation.
Theory-building through transforming qualitative data collected in ethno-
graphic research into an experimental test. On occasion, experimenters partici-
pate actively in an ongoing social situation, taking whatever opportunities are
available to test deductive hypotheses by categorizing qualitative data. Although
psychological social psychologists have not often ventured into natural field
situations as participant observers, a few studies indicate that participant observa-
tion is compatible with hypothesis testing. Perhaps the most remarkable study of
this type is the classic field study of Leon Festinger, Henry Riecken, and Stanley
Schachter (1956), detailed in the book When Prophecy Fails. While this book led
to much experimental research on dissonance theory, and thus the research project
involved sequential data, the study also involved merged data. This classic social
psychological study may seem an odd choice to demonstrate the merging of
quantitative and qualitative data in that no statistical information is presented.6
The quantitative data seemingly have been overlooked. Yet, if one includes
nominal variables as ‘‘quantitative’’ in which a response is present or absent, then
this study, as we discuss below, designed to be deductive hypothesis testing can be
considered as involving quantitative as well as qualitative data. In other words,
the researchers, in effect, used the tactic of transforming qualitative observations
6 Some sociological ethnographies, such as William Foote Whyte’s (1943) Street Corner Society
and Howard Becker et al.’s (1961) Boys in White, use statistical measures to test hypotheses. In the
former instance, the role of group status on performance, and in the latter, the effects of years of
training on the fate of idealism of medical students. We select this social psychological study since it is
so widely known to readers of this journal.
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into ‘‘quantitative’’ measures that tested their theory, examining the proportion of
those they observed who behaved in ways that the hypothesis predicted.
The goal of the research was to observe the unconstrained, unscripted character
of the interaction of a group that believed in a millennial prophecy, testing the
effects of belief disconfirmation on subsequent belief and group loyalty. Specifi-
cally Festinger et al. (1956, p. 216) argued that under specified conditions
increased proselytizing should occur after belief disconfirmation. These condi-
tions included (1) conviction, (2) commitment to the conviction, and (3) social
support under conditions of disconfirmation.
Through participant observation, largely conducted by five collaborators,
Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter explored the effects of a millennial prophecy
concerning the end of the world and a visit by space aliens, held by a small group
of Chicago-based believers called ‘‘The Seekers.’’ The continued existence of the
world after the date of the prophecy allowed the researchers to examine a set of
behavioral dependent variables, notably the continued proselytizing by some
members after the disconfirmation. They discovered that those members of the
group that were clearly convinced of the prophecy, those that had made public
commitments (and took action to put their lives in order in preparation for the
world’s end), and those who had social support through continued participation in
the group did reveal increased commitment, and this was not the case with those
who did not fall in these categories. One can think of these conditions as naturally
occurring independent variables and the subsequent proselytizing behavior of
participants as dependent variables, testing dissonance theory in a natural setting.
Persons would either reveal the dependent variable or not and would, thus, in
effect provide a quantitative measure of the hypothesis, as the researchers coded
their notes into the presence or absence of the hypothesized behavior. The
qualitative information, providing the rich details of decision making in the
context of a deviant belief system, helps readers understand the process by which
these conditions have their effects.
Festinger et al. (1956, p. 249) recognized that in this setting they were ‘‘unable
to rely on the standard array of technical tools of social psychology’’ and so hoped
‘‘to collect enough information to tell a coherent story,’’ noting that ‘‘fortunately,
the effects of disconfirmation were striking enough to provide for firm conclu-
sions.’’ Though these research tactics are distinct methodologically from labora-
tory research, their innovative study indicates that it is possible to ‘‘test’’
hypotheses by observing natural interaction, particularly when the independent
variables are powerful. Although the absence of experimental control challenges
standard tactics of hypothesis testing, the behaviors of participants are predict-
able.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we present possibilities for incorporating qualitative data in
social psychological theory building, deliberately addressing a skeptical audi-
ence. Scholars are understandably wedded to methodologies that have served
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them well, those in which they have been trained and those with the imprimatur of
disciplinary approval. Though the use of qualitative data has become accepted
across much of the social sciences, this has not occurred in psychological social
psychology. Yet, as social psychologists ourselves and as practitioners of qualita-
tive research, we believe that such alternative approaches have had and will have
benefits if used more widely. We are not making the radical charge that experimen-
tal methodologies lack value; rather, we claim that a broader array of tools permits
problems to be approached from multiple perspectives.
Qualitative data can and should be integrated into social psychological theory
building. We have shown how qualitative data can be used in sequence with
experimental data as a method of cycling between inductive theory building and
deductive theory testing. Further, we argue that one can transform how one views
experimental situations so that qualitative data become relevant, defining the
seeming artificiality of the psychological laboratory as a ‘‘real-world’’ setting:
that of the psychological laboratory. This claim suggests that all human behavior
has a naturalistic ethos. The preceding discussion of sequential and merged tactics
for integrating ethnographic data with traditional experimental data provides a
framework for theory building that answers the call for a ‘‘full-cycle’’ approach to
social psychological research (Cialdini, 1980). Just as qualitative data have come
of age in sociology, anthropology, organizational behavior, education, nursing,
and political science, psychological social psychology can benefit from expand-
ing its methodological arsenal. Through qualitative data, researchers can discover
the multiple ways in which cognition (expressed, as it always is, in talk and
action), emotion, and shared meaning can be integrated into a better understand-
ing of human behavior.
Every methodological choice involves benefits and trade-offs. The trade-offs
involved in qualitative research will surely be evident to most experimenters.
Still, using the power of this approach to extend the validity of social psychologi-
cal theory is no small benefit. It is true that the devil is in the details, but, then, so
are the angels.
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